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NOTES & COMMENTS
Hill-Burton Notice Provisions: Informing the Indigent
In 1946, Congress enacted the Hospital Survey and Construction Act,'
better known as the Hill-Burton Act.2 The primary purpose behind the
legislation was to fund the construction of nonprofit health facilities.3 The
legislation required that Hill-Burton grantees 4 be open to all people in the
area in which the facility is located.- The requirement that Hill-Burton
facilities provide a reasonable amount of services to people unable to pay,6
the "free services" assurance, was added to the original 1945 bill as a
concession to liberal senators who had failed in their attempt to include
national health insurance as part of the program.'
I Hospital Survey and Construction Act, Pub. L. No. 79-725, § 2, 60 Stat. 1041 (1946)
(as amended 42 U.S.C. §§ 291-291o (1976)) [hereinafter cited as Hospital Survey and Con-
struction Act].
2 For discussions of the legislative history of the Hospital Survey and Construction Act,
see S. REP. No. 1285, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. , reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 7842, 7859-60 [hereinafter cited as Senate Report]; Rose, The Duty of Publicly-
Funded Hospitals to Provide Services to the Medically Indigent, 3 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 254,
261-62 (1970).
3 Section 601 of the original Act states in relevant part: "[tlhe purpose of this title is
to assist the several States - . . . (b) to construct public and other nonprofit hospitals in
accordance with such [state survey and construction] programs." Hospital Survey and Con-
struction Act, supra note 1, § 601. See also Hearings on § 191 Before the Senate Comm. on
Education and Labor, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 30, 190-91 (1945). Initially, state agencies were
authorized to spend $75 million per year for five years to survey hospital needs and carry out
construction programs based on those surveys. Hospital Survey and Construction Act, supra
note 1, § 621.
1 Hill-Burton grantees or recipients are health facilities that have received funds from
the program. Hill-Burton applicants are health facilities that are seeking funds under the
program.
See Hospital Survey and Construction Act, supra note 1, § 622(0(1). The original
requirement, known as the "community services assurance," that the facility be open to all
persons in the community, allowed discrimination "where separate hospital facilities are
provided for separate population groups, if the plan makes equitable provision on the basis
of need for facilities and services of like quality for each such group . . . ." Id. In 1963, the
"separate but equal" clause was held unconstitutional by the Fourth Circuit in Simkins v.
Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959, 969-70 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S.
938 (1964). In response to Simkins, Congress deleted the "separate but equal" provision in
1964. 43 Fed. Reg. 49,954,49,955 (1978)). In 1974, HEW issued detailed compliance require-
ments to insure that Hill-Burton facilities meet their "community services" obligation. 39
Fed. Reg. 31,766 (1974) (codified at 42 C.F.R. § 53.113 (1978)). The 1974 regulations were
prompted by Cook v. Ochsner Foundation Hosp., 61 F.R.D. 354, 360-61 (E.D. La. 1972). Cook
required that Hill-Burton facilities must participate in the Medicaid program and cannot
exclude persons because they are Medicaid recipients. Id.
I See Hospital Survey and Construction Act, supra note 1, § 622(0(2). Section 622(f)(2)
is commonly referred to as the "free services assurance."
I Rose, Federal Regulation of Services to the Poor Under the Hill-Burton Act: Realities
and Pitfalls, 70 Nw. L. REv. 168, 170 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Rose]. Senator Robert Taft
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By 1974, Hill-Burton grants had helped finance a substantial propor-
tion of the health care facilities in the United States., Unfortunately, vir-
tually no change was made from 1946 to 1972 in the vague free service
compliance standard for grantees? Prompted by litigation,'" the Depart-
ment of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) finally issued regulations
in 1972 which were designed to govern the free service obligation of the
Hill-Burton recipients." The 1972 regulations were amended in 1975 to
include a posted notice provision to help inform those people unable to
afford the full cost of medical treatment of a Hill-Burton hospital's free
service obligation.'" The adequacy and form of the notice provision has
casually suggested during the hearings that facilities receiving Hill-Burton funds should be
required to provide a certain level of free services to those unable to pay. Id. Taft's suggestion
later emerged as § 622(f) (2) of the 1946 Act which states: "there will be made available in
each such hospital or addition to a hospital a reasonable volume of hospital services to
persons unable to pay therefor, but an exception shall be made if such a requirement is not
feasible from a financial standpoint." Hospital Survey and Construction Act, supra note 1,
§ 622(0 (2).
By 1974, congressional appropriations under the program had totaled over $4.4 billion
with $2.0 billion of loans authorized. Senate Report, supra note 2, at 7860. Appropriations
for the Hill-Burton program reached a peak of $270 million in 1967. Id. at 7861. In years 1972
through 1974, Congress appropriated $197.2 million annually. Id. A 1972 study indicated that
Hill-Burton funds had financed approximately 35 percent of the general hospital beds in the
United States. Comment, Provision of Free Medical Services by Hill-Burton Hospitals, 8
HARV. C.F.C.L. L. REV. 351, 352 n.9 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Provision of Free Medical
Services] (citing Public Health Service, U.S. Dep't of Health, Education and Welfare, FACTS
ABOUT THE HILL-BURTON PROGRAM, JULY 1, 1947 - JUNE 30, 1971, at 4 (HEW Pub. No. 72-
4006, 1972)). The need for more hospital beds has virtually disappeared, but the funding
program remans essential since roughly one-third of the country's general hospitals and long-
term care facilities require remodeling or replacement. Senate Report, supra note 2, at 7864.
1 Before 1972, the standard for compliance with the free services assurance aspect of the
Hill-Burton program was extremely general. 43 Fed. Reg. 49,954, 49,954 (1978). See 42 C.F.R.
§§ 53.1-.79 (Supp. 1947). In 1970, HEW admitted that the department had never enforced
the free services assurance obligation despite 42 U.S.C. § 291g (1976), which authorized the.
Surgeon General to withhold funds from facilities which did not carry through with the free
services assurance. Provision of Free Medical Services, supra note 8, at 356 n.36. The lack of
enforcement by HEW was not a result of Hill-Burton facilities complying with the free
services provision. A 1972 survey of approximately 187 nonprofit Hill-Burton hospitals found
that roughly 70% had not met the compliance guidelines at that time. Cypen, Access to
Health Care Services for the Poor: Existing Programs and Limitations, 31 U. MIAMI L. REv.
127, 136 (1976).
, See text accompanying note 21 infra.
See 37 Fed. Reg. 182, 182-93 (1972). The initial proposals were issued April 18, 1972.
37 Fed. Reg. 7,632 (1972). The regulations were issued in interim form on July 22, 1972 and
in final form with some technical changes on June 22, 1973. 37 Fed. Reg. 14,719 (1972); 38
Fed. Reg. 16,353 (1973). See also text accompanying notes 22-29 infra.
12 42 C.F.R. § 53.111(i) (1978). The suggested language of the posted notice requirement
is set forth below:
Notice of Hill-Burton Obligation
This hospital (or other facility) is required by law to give a reasonable amount
of service at no cost or less than full cost to people who cannot pay. If you think
that you are eligible for these services, please contact our business office (give office
location) and ask for assistance. If you are not satisfied with the results, you may
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been a continual source of controversy since the 1975 regulations.'3 HEW
recently has suggested an alternative individual written notice provision"
that the Department believes will provide meaningful notice to indigents
of the possibility of below cost health care at Hill-Burton hospitals.
The Hill-Burton Act was enacted primarily to meet growing deficien-
cies in the supply and distribution of health facilities in the United
States.'5 Very few hospitals were built during the Depression or World War
II and existing facilities were becoming obsolete.'6 To meet the growing
need for new medical facilities, the Hill-Burton program allocated federal
funds to the states, which planned the final distribution to Hill-Burton
applicant facilities.'7 The Surgeon General maintained oversight of the
program by virtue of his authority to reject individual state plans.' 8 The
Surgeon General also was empowered by the 1946 Act to prescribe regula-
tions which would require that an applicant give assurance to the state
agency administering the program that a reasonable volume of free services
would be provided to persons unable to pay.'" The initial regulations re-
stated the free service obligation as expressed in the 1946 Act, but failed
to establish any compliance levels of free services for Hill-Burton recipi-
ents.20
As a result of lawsuits brought by indigents to enforce Hill-Burton
hospitals' free service obligation, 2' HEW proposed the first detailed free
contact (the state Hill-Burton agency with address).
Id. Section 53.111(i) also provides:
[t]hat an applicant which has selected a presumptive compliance guideline
under paragraph (d)(1) of this section may, at its option, either (1) add to such
notice language stating that the facility's obligation is limited to a specified dollar
volume of uncompensated services and that if the facility has, during a specified
period (e.g., year, quarter, month), already provided a volume of uncompensated
services sufficient to satisfy such obligation, any person inquiring about such serv-
ices will be given a written statement to that effect which shall also state when
additional uncompensated services will be available; or (2) post an additional no-
tice stating that the facility's obligation has been satisfied for the current period
and stating when additional uncompensated services will be available.
Id. (emphasis added). For an explanation of the presumptive guidelines, see note 25 infra.
'3 See text accompanying notes 37-61 infra.
" 43 Fed. Reg. 49,954, 49,965-66 (1978) (to be codified in 42 C.F.R. § 124.505).
' Senate Report, supra note 2, at 7859; see note 3 supra.
' Senate Report, supra note 2, at 7859.
, Hospital Survey and Construction Act, supra note 1, §§ 611, 621.
Id. § 632 (Withholding of Certification).
" Id. § 622(f)(2).
20 42 C.F.R. § 53.63 (Supp. 1947). See generally 42 C.F.R. §§ 53.1-.79 (Supp. 1947). The
requirement to provide free services would be waived if the facility demonstrated that provid-
ing such services was not financially feasible. Id. § 53.63.
2' See, e.g., Euresti v. Stenner, 458 F.2d 1115 (10th Cir. 1972); Organized Migrants in
Community Action, Inc. v. James Archer Smith Hosp., 325 F. Supp. 268 (S.D. Fla. 1971);
Cook v. Ochsner Foundation Hosp., 319 F. Supp. 603 (E.D. La. 1970). But see Stanturf v.
Sipes, 224 F. Supp. 883 (W.D. Mo. 1963). Since neither the Hill-Burton Act nor the initial
regulations authorized private civil actions, these early cases were important in that Euresti,
OMICA, and Cook established the right of a person who was denied services to bring suit
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service regulations in 1972.22 The 1972 regulations were designed to estab-
lish more specific guidelines for compliance and enforcement of the free
services aspect of the Hill-Burton program.? Principally, the 1972 regula-
tions were aimed at three different areas. First, the state agency was re-
sponsible for setting eligibility criteria for persons unable to pay.',
Second, the regulations defined free service compliance levels for Hill-
Burton recipients.? Third, the 1972 regulations provided guidelines for
against a Hill-Burton facility for such a denial.
The unsuccessful plaintiff in Stanturf instituted his suit against Wright Memorial Hospi-
tal, a Hill-Burton facility, after the hospital refused him admission. 224 F. Supp. at 884. The
plaintiff asserted that he was a third-party beneficiary of a contract between the hospital and
the federal government and thus had standing to bring the action. Id. at 890. The contractual
relationship was allegedly created by virtue of the federal government giving funds to the
hospital under the Hill-Burton program. Id. The court, unable to find any authority for the
plaintiff's novel argument, dismissed the suit. Id.
In Cook, the plaintiffs sought to compel defendant hospitals to provide a reasonable
volume of free services to those persons unable to pay. 319 F. Supp. at 606. The district court
allowed the suit, accepting what had been called a "unique" argument by the Stanturf court
seven years earlier. Id. at 605.06. The Cook court reasoned that since the Hill-Burton Act did
not authorize private civil actions, the plaintiffs would have to be regarded as "somewhat
analogous to third-party beneficiaries of a contract and a civil action would have to be implied
under the act" before the suit could be entertained. Id. at 605. Crucial to the court's analysis
was the Fifth Circuit's rationale in Gomez v. Florida State Employment Serv., 417 F.2d 569
(5th Cir. 1969). In Gomez, migratory farm workers sought relief from injuries suffered as a
result of alleged violations of federal regulations concerning wage and housing standards for
migrant farm workers promulgated under the authority of the Wagner-Peyser Act. Id. at 570.
See also 29 U.S.C. §§ 49-49k. (1976). Similar to the Hill-Burton Act, the Wagner-Peyser Act
had no provision which allowed a private civil action to be brought. Id. The Fifth Ciicuit,
however, held that such an action could be maintained because the migratory workers were
the real beneficiaries of the Act. 417 F.2d at 577. In order to protect the interests of the
beneficiaries, the Gomez court reasoned that the Wagner-Peyser Act called for implied
remedies. Id. at 576. The Cook court accepted the Fifth Circuit's reasoning and applied the
analysis to the Hill-Burton Act Act because the mechanics of the two acts were so similar.
319 F. Supp. at 605-06. Both Wagner-Peyser and Hill-Burton were governed by federal
regulations and promulgated for the benefit of a special class of persons, migratory farm
workers and persons unable to pay the full cost of medical treatment, respectively. The
Gomez reasoning, adopted by Cook, was followed in both Euresti and OMICA. See 458 F.2d
at 1117-18; 325 F. Supp. at 271.
2 37 Fed. Reg. 7,632, 7,632-34 (1972); see note 11 supra.
2 37 Fed. Reg. 7,632, 7,632 (1972).
24 42 C.F.R. § 53.111(g) (1978). Persons who are unable to pay must first qualify for free
services. Eligibility criteria are determined by the state agency administering the program
in accordance with generally recognized standards of need, such as the current Social Security
Administration poverty income level, or the Current Office of Economic Opportunity Income
Poverty Guidelines applicable for the area, or any other equivalent measures which the
Secretary finds provide a reasonable basis for determining an individual's ability to pay. Id.
Additional factors to be considered in reaching the eligibility determination include the
medical insurance coverage of the patient, the size of the patient's family, and other financial
liabilities and assets of the patient and his or her family. Id. Section 53.111(g)(2) provides
that a copy of the criteria be given upon request, to any person seeking services from a Hill-
Burton facility.
25 42 C.F.R. § 53.111(d), (h) (as amended). Section 53.111(d) established a presumptive
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enforcing the free service obligation and possible sanctions which could be
imposed by the state agency for failure to comply." The 1972 regulations,
however, lacked any individual or posted notice provisions which could
benefit those patients who were unable to pay fully for medical services.
The initial regulations did include two sections which could, under certain
circumstances, help notify indigents of the availability of less than full cost
medical care. Section 53.111(g)(2) provided that a copy of the eligibility
criteria should be given to any individual seeking services at a Hill-Burton
facility, but only upon request.2 Section 53.111(h)(4) required the state
agency administering the program to publish the rate of uncompensated
services established for the applicant hospital in a newspaper of general
circulation within the community served by the applicant.Y Although the
1972 regulations did not provide any on-site notice to persons seeking
services from a Hill-Burton facility, they helped to define the free services
obligation of Hill-Burton recipients and demonstrated that compliance
with the obligation was an important aspect of the Hill-Burton program.
The 1972 regulations remained substantially unchanged2 until 1975
compliance guideline for Hill-Burton facilities. A hospital is in presumptive compliance with
the free services provision of the Act if the facility makes uncompensated services available
at a level not less than the lesser of three percent of operating costs or 10 percent of all federal
assistance provided under the program; or if the facility certifies that persons unable to pay
for services will not be denied admission. A Hill-Burton facility which chooses never to deny
persons admission because of financial reasons is said to operate under an "open door" policy.
A 1974 report indicated that 2,019 out of 3,125 Hill-Burton facilities chose the open door
policy to meet their free services obligation. Rose, supra note 7, at 190 n.131.
Section 53.111(h) applies to facilities which do not choose the presumptive compliance
guidelines as the standard for their free services obligation. The state agency is responsible
for setting the compliance level at such facilities based on the financial status of the facility,
the nature and quantity of service provided by the applicant, the need for free services within
the area, and the extent and nature of any joint or cooperative programs the facility may take
part in with other facilities for the distribution of free services. In no event is the level for
uncompensated services set by the state agency to exceed the presumptive compliance guide-
line. 42 C.F.R. § 53.111(h) (1978).
29 42 C.F.R. § 53.111(e), (j). Section 53.111(e) requires that each facility submit a copy
of its annual statement to the state agency. Id. § 53.111(e). Such statement must include the
facility's operating costs and the amount of uncompensated services provided in that year.
Section 53.111(j) requires the state agency to determine annually whether each facility is
meeting its quota of free services. Id. § 53.111(0). Section 53.111(j) also suggests that if a
facility does not comply with the free services provision, the state agency may impose sanc-
tions including, but not limited to, license revocation, termination of state assistance, and
court action. Id.
- 42 C.F.R. § 53.111(g)(2) (1978). For an explanation of the eligibility criteria see note
24 supra.
42 C.F.R. § 53.111(h)(4) (1978). The published notice should contain a statement "that
the documents upon which the agency based its determination are available for public inspec-
tion at a location and time prescribed," and if the rate established by the state agency is less
than the presumptive compliance guideline, anyone wishing to object "may do so by writing
to the State agency within 20 days after publication of the notice." Id.
21 Amendments effective on June 22, 1973 made minor changes in § 53.111(e)(3) and §
53.111(h)(4) and (5). Section 53.111(e)(3) was changed to eliminate unnecessary reporting
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when litigation once again prompted changes by HEW. In Corum v. Beth
Israel Medical Center,"0 the New York district court held section
53.111(f)(1) of the 1972 regulations invalid.31 Section 53.111(f)(1) allowed
a Hill-Burton recipient to suspend determination of a patient's eligibility
for free services until after the patient received his bill.3" The court ac-
cepted the plaintiffs' argument that many truly eligible persons would be
discouraged from seeking any medical care because of the uncertainty of
their status if a determination of their eligibility could be delayed until
after billing.3 The uncertainity arises in the case of a truly eligible person
because, by deferring the eligibility determination, the hospital's free serv-
ices obligation may have been met for the current period. 4 The Corum
court concluded that section 53.111(f)(1) would act to bar even eligible
persons from seeking the benefits of the free services provision. 5 The dis-
trict court consequently held that the eligibility determination must be
made before rendition of services, and declared section 53.111(f)(1) in-
valid .
36
The 1975 amended regulations reflected the district court's holding by
requiring the eligibility determination to by made prior to the rendition of
services. 37 HEW also added a provision to the 1975 regulations requiring
requirements for facilities that operated under an open door policy. 38 Fed. Reg. 16,353,
16,354 (1973). See also note 25 supra. Section 53.111(h)(4), which originally allowed objec-
tions regardless of the rate set by the state agency, was amended only to require published
notice to include a statement that persons wishing to object to the rate may do so by writing
the state agency within 20 days only if the rate established by the state agency is less than
the presumptive compliance guideline. Id.
31 373 F. Supp. 550 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
3' Id. at 557-58.
32 42 C.F.R. § 53.111(f)(1) (1974). Subsection (f)(1) stated in relevant part:
In determining the amount of uncompensated services provided by an applicant,
there shall be included only those services provided to an individual with respect
to whom the applicant has made a written determination prior to any collection
effort other than the rendition of bills that such individual is unable to pay there-
for....
Id. (emphasis added).
11 373 F. Supp. at 557.
31 Id. A person truly unable to pay might hesitate to obtain medical services because the
hospital could meet its current free services obligation sometime between treatment and
billing.
35 Id.
11 Id. at 557-58.
37 42 C.F.R. § 53.111(f) (1978). HEW agreed with the Corum court that there was no
apparent justification for delay in making determinations with respect to patients who are
clearly unable to pay. 40 Fed. Reg. 46,202, 46,202 (1975). Consequently, the language of the
billing provision, subsection (f), was changed to require that the determination of eligibility
be made prior to the rendition of services except in emergency cases or when a change in
circumstances occurred. 42 C.F.R. § 53.111(f0 (1978). An eligibility determination may be
made after treatment if, for example, the patient's financial condition has changed due to a
loss of wages resulting from the illness or if insurance coverage or income from other sources
is less than anticipated or if the costs of the medical treatment are greater than anticipated.
Id. Revised § 53.111(f)(1)(i) also provides that in an emergency case when the eligibility
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Hill-Burton facilities to post notice of their free services obligation in order
to inform "patients or potential patients that criteria for eligibility and
applications are available upon request. . . ."I The posted notice provi-
sion, section 53.111(i), essentially requires a statement indicating the
determination must be delayed, any billing must also include notice of the availability of free
services similar to the posted notice provision of § 53.111(i). Id.
u 42 C.F.R. § 53.111(i) (1978). The 1975 changes were first published in March 1975 as
proposals with comments invited. 40 Fed. Reg. 10,686, 10,686-87 (1975). A number of the
approximately 250 comments received complained that there was no necessity to advise
indigent patients of the availability of uncompensated services prior to the rendition of
services. 40 Fed. Reg. 46,202, 46,202 (1975). HEW reacted to the criticism by noting that the
objections were inconsistent with the Corum holding as well as the fundamental policy under-
lying § 53.111 and the statute on which it is based. Id. The proposed regulations went into
effect in October 1975. Id. at 46,203; 42 C.F.R. § 53.111(i) (1978); see note 12 supra. The North
Carolina district court's position regarding notice in Gordon v. Forsyth Hosp. Auth., Inc., 409
F. Supp. 708 (M.D.N.C. 1976), was consistent with the 1975 regulation. Plaintiffs brought a
class action suit prior to the 1975 regulations asking for declaratory and injunctive relief
against the county hospital authority which would require that the plaintiffs receive free
medical services at two hospitals in accordance with the Hill-Burton Act. Id. at 711. Standing
was not an issue in Forsyth because Congress provided a statutory means for private litigants
to institute civil actions for compliance with the free services provision when it implemented
title XVI of the Public Health Service Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 300p-2(c) (1976). See also note
21 supra (standing before title XVI). The Hill-Burton Act was adopted in 1946 as Title VI of
the Public Health Service Act of 1944. Hospital Survey and Construction Act, supra note 1,
at § 2. In 1975, Congress enacted title XVI to replace the title VI assistance program. 43 Fed.
Reg. 49,954, 49,954 (1978). The free services assurance requirement of title XVI is substan-
tially the same as the title VI provision. Id. at 49,955. Section 300p-2(c), the exclusive remedy
for private individuals; requires that before a lawsuit may be filed by a private individual,
he first must exhaust administrative remedies by filing a complaint with the Secretary of
HEW. If the Secretary dismisses the complaint or the Attorney General does not bring a civil
action for compliance within six months of filing, the individual may seek legal relief. Id.
The Forsyth plaintiffs sought compliance with the free services obligation with respect
to two hospitals in the area, only one of which was a Hill-Burton recipient (Forsyth). 409 F.
Supp. at 711. The court dismissed the claim against the non-Hill-Burton facility for want of
jurisdiction because the facility was not charged with any Hill-Burton responsibilities. Id. at
725. Among other contentions, the plaintiffs asserted that the court should issue an injunction
requiring Forsyth to give notice to patients at the time of their admission of Forsyth's uncom-
pensated services obligation. Id. at 711. The court recognized that notice was necessary to
satisfy the free services obligation and observed that the current free services regulations
simply provided for yearly'published notice in a newspaper of general circulation within the
community indicating the level of uncompensated services to be provided by the Hill-Burton
facility. See text accompanying note 28 supra. The Forsyth court had access to the proposed
posted notice provision and reasoned that posted notice would be far more effective in com-
municating information to eligible persons than an annual newspaper publication. 409 F.
Supp. at 725. Furthermore, the court believed that such notice was necessary as a practical
matter to give effect to the free services provision of the Hill-Burton Act. Id. Appropriately
placed posted notices, according to the court's analysis, would be an effective and satisfactory
means of informing the public of the availability of free services. Id. The Forsyth court,
however, did not determine whether posted notice was constitutionally required to meet
procedural due process. The court held that the Hill-Burton facility should adopt the pro-
posed notice provision until it became codified in 42 C.F.R. § 53.111, at which time the
hospital should change the notice, if necessary, to comply with the federal regulations. 409
F. Supp. at 725.
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availability of free services. 3 The notice shall be multilingual if the appli-
cant serves a multilingual community, and posted in appropriate areas
within the facility (admissions office, emergency department and business
office)." Any applicant which selected a presumptive compliance guide-
line4' may add to the posted notice language which explains that the facil-
ity already may have met its obligation for the current period. 2 Hill-
Burton hospitals which have met their free services obligation for the cur-
rent period may add a statement to the posted notice indicating when
uncompensated services will be available again.4"
Although the 1975 regulations are still in effect, the recent Tennessee
district court decision in Newsom v. Vanderbilt University" prompted
HEW to issue proposed regulations 5 which would require individual writ-
ten notice to anyone seeking services from a Hill-Burton facility. 8 In
Newsom, the plaintiff argued that Vanderbilt University Hospital failed
to provide a reasonable volume of free services to those persons unable to
pay, and alternatively that if the hospital did meet its obligation, the
procedures for distribution of free services violated procedural due process
under the fifth and fourteenth amendments."7 The court noted that unless
the Hill-Burton facility's allocation of free services amounted to state ac-
tion, the fifth and fourteenth amendments would be inapplicable. 8 The
11 42 C.F.R. § 53.111(i) (1978).
10 42 C.F.R. § 53.111(i) (1978); see note 12 supra.
4' See 42 C.F.R. § 53.111(d) (1978). See also note 25 supra.
42 42 C.F.R. § 53.111(i) (1978).
43 Id.
" 453 F. Supp. 401 (M.D. Tenn. 1978).
45 See 43 Fed. Reg. 49,954, 49,954 (1978); text accompanying notes 62-68 infra. The 1978
proposed regulations were also an indirect response to a large number of administrative
complaints that had been received by HEW after Congress enacted title XVI in 1975. Id. at
49,955. Section 1612(c) of title XVI authorized private individuals to file complaints with the
Secretary of HEW charging noncompliance with the free services provision. 42 U.S.C. § 300p-
2(c) (1976). Section 1612(c) additionally requires the Secretary to make periodic investiga-
tions of Hill-Burton facilities to determine whether such facilities are in compliance with the
free services obligation. Id. The proposed regulations reflect, in part, findings acquired
through investigations of Hill-Burton grantees. 43 Fed. Reg. 49,954, 49,955 (1978).
41 43 Fed. Reg. 49,954, 49,965-66 (1978) (to be codified as 42 C.F.R. § 124.505).
17 453 F. Supp. at 405. The plaintiff in Newsom achieved standing by first exhausting
her administrative remedies in accordance with § 300p-2(c) of title 42. Id. See note 39 supra.
See also U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
"1 453 F. Supp. at 419. Federal district and circuit courts which had examined the
question of whether the receipt of Hill-Burton funds constituted state action reached incon-
sistent results. Compare Jackson v. Norton-Children's Hosp., Inc., 487 F.2d 502, 503 (6th Cir.
1973) (something more than partial federal funding necessary to create state action in activi-
ties of ostensibly private hospital); and O'Neill v. Grayson County War Memorial Hosp., 472
F.2d 1140, 1143 (6th Cir. 1973) (provisions in lease of hospital premises indicated that hospital
was not purely private and therefore was not immune from fourteenth amendment); and
Chiaffitelli v. Dettmer Hosp., Inc., 437 F.2d 429, 430 (6th Cir. 1971) (five of nine members of
hospital board responsible to public gave hospital the character of public agency subject to §
1983); with Holton v. Crozer-Chester Medical Center, 419 F. Supp. 334, 341 (E.D. Pa. 1976),
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Newsom court concluded, however, that the nexus between the govern-
ment and the distribution of Hill-Burton free services was sufficiently close
so that the action of the hospital could be treated as the state action. 9
The hospital maintained that indigents were not entitled to procedural
due process because the Vanderbilt University Hospital's free service obli-
gation was insufficient to meet the need for below cost medical treatment.
Thus, not all eligible patients had the right to receive free services from
the Hill-Burton facility."0 The court rejected the hospital's argument and
held that the denial of free services could be accomplished only if the
procedures satisfied due process requirements.5 ' The Newsom court rea-
soned that distribution of free services in a manner which complies with
due process would insure that the resources are not allocated arbitrarily. 5
To meet due process standards, the court held that indigents could be
denied treatment under the Hill-Burton program only if they are first given
meaningful notice of the possibility of obtaining free care and of the writ-
ten eligibility criteria.1
3
vacated and remanded, 460 F.2d 575 (3rd Cir. 1977) (private non-profit hospital not subject
to § 1983 unless participation with government direct and intimate).
"1 453 F. Supp. at 420. The Newsom court adopted the "something more" test from the
Norton-Children's case, see note 48 supra, but reasoned that regulation alone would not be
the "something more" which was necessary to create state action. 453 F. Supp. at 420. The
Newsom court also cited Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974), for the
proposition that the crucial question to be answered is whether a sufficiently close nexus
exists between the state and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action
of the latter may be treated as that of the state. 453 F. Supp. at 420. The plaintiff in Norton-
Children's was a physician who tried to assert state action by claiming that he had been
wrongly dismissed from the staff of a Hill-Burton hospital. The Newsom court concluded that
the nexus between the doctor's dismissal and the government was tenuous at best compared
to the relationship between the government and the allocation of free services pursuant to
the Hill-Burton Act. Id. The court therefore held that state action existed since the
"something more" test was satisfied in Newsom. Id.
5o 453 F. Supp. at 422. The defendants argued that not everyone in need of free services,
even if eligible, would receive them, because the hospital was only required to provide a
reasonable volume of free services. Id. A qualified indigent always faces the risk that the
hospital has met its free services obligation for the current period. The defendants reasoned
that because individual indigents did not have a right to free care, they were not entitled to
due process under the fifth and fourteenth amendments. Id.
5, Id. at 423 (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)). The Newsom court, relying
on Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), concluded that the plaintiff and the class
of indigents she represented had a constitutionally protected property interest in free services
under the Hill-Burton program. 453 F. Supp. at 422-23. In Roth, the court stated that prop-
erty interests "are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understand-
ings that stem from an independent source such as state law - rules or understandings that
secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits." 408 U.S. at
577. "Rules and understandings" which led the Newsom court to conclude that the plintiff
was entitled to procedural due process included the plaintiff's claim for free services, which
derived both from statute and regulation, as well as the plaintiff's ability to enforce the free
services provision. 453 F. Supp. at 423.
5 453 F. Supp. at 423.
" Id. at 424; see note 24 supra.
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The focus of the Newsom analysis then shifted to the posted notice
provision of the 1975 regulations to determine whether the provision pro-
vided the "meaningful" notice required by due process standards. 4 The
court determined that while posted notice was more effective than an
annual publication in an area newspaper, 5 the posted provision still fell
far short of constitutional requirements." The court based its finding
largely on the testimony of hospital personnel which indicated that only a
few persons inquired about Hill-Burton care. 57 The testimony, viewed in
light of the fact that approximately 105 persons were denied care for finan-
cial reasons over roughly the same period of time that the hospital person-
nel were deposed,58 led the Newsom court to conclude that posted notice
was ineffective." The court reasoned that if posted notice had been effec-
tive, more persons would have inquired about the Hill-Burton program. To
be effective, the court held that actual notice of the facility's Hill-Burton
obligation must be given to persons who otherwise would be denied admis-
sion for financial reasons and who are ineligible to receive less than cost
care at another facility in the area. 5 The court suggested, for simplicity,
that the free services notice be attached to the admission application."
In accordance with the Newsom opinion, HEW believes the 1978 regu-
lations" will assure that Hill-Burton grantees distribute free services fairly,
5 Id. at 424-29; see note 12 supra.
5 453 F. Supp. at 425.
Id. at 428.
Id. at 426-28. The Newsom deposees included the hospital's service representative, a
financial counselor, and the hospital's director of admissions. Each of these individuals was
engaged in the admission of patients, and each had personal contact with individuals who
were seeking hospital treatment. Id. Despite the close contact with incoming patients, the
service representative could not recall any patient telling her that he or she read the posted
notice and desired to apply for Hill-Burton free services. Id. at 426. Nor could the financial
counselor remember a patient ever mention that he or she saw the posted notice. Id. at 427.
The hospital's director of admissions was the only deposee that recalled inquiries concerning
free services that resulted from patients reading the posted notice. To his own knowledge,
approximately six to eight patients made requests for uncompensated care based on the
posted notice. Id. at 428.
58 Vanderbilt Hospital's service representative, financial counselor, and director of ad-
missions were deposed on various dates over a five and one-half month period before trial.
During this time, approximately 105 persons were denied admission for financial reasons. Id.
at 428.
11 Id. The Newsom court noted that for posted notice to be effective, a patient must
perform four steps. First, the patient must see the notice. Second, he must read the notice.
Third, he must understand the notice. Finally, he must act by inquiring at the proper location
about the availability of free services. Id.
40 Id.
11 Id. The Newsom court suggested that a regulation be promulgated requiring that
notice actually be read by (or to) any patient who was unable to obtain or continue needed
care for financial reasons. Id. The court specifically directed this suggestion to patients who
became eligible under the "changed circumstances" provision. Id. See generally 42 C.F.R. §
53.111(f)(1)(ii) (1978); note 37 supra.
12 43 Fed. Reg. 49,954 (1978) (to be codified in 42 C.F.R. § 124). The proposed regulations
were made to promote "proper administration of the statute." Id. at 49,959.
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that the required amount of free services are delivered, and that the serv-
ices are administered to those who should receive them. 3 Proposed subsec-
tions 124.505(b) and (c) require that a Hill-Burton facility provide both
posted and individual written notice." Subsections (b) and (c) propose four
basic changes from the existing posted notice provision. Subsection (b)
requires that the heading of the posted notice be legible at a distance of
fifteen feet. 5 Second, "multilingual" has been defined. 6 Third, subsection
(b)(2) requires a facility which has met its free services obligation for the
current period to post notice to that effect.6" Finally, section 124.505(c)
requires individual written notice of the availability of free services to be
given to anyone who seeks services. 8
In its explanation of the proposed regulations, HEW acknowledged the
ineffectiveness of posted notice as the sole means of informing persons of
the availability of uncompensated services. By requiring individual writ-
ten notice, HEW effectively adopted the suggestion in Newsom that notice
appear on the signature page of a Hill-Burton facility's admission form."0
The individual written notice regulation, proposed section 124.505(c), re-
quires that the written notice contain the same informatibn as the posted
notice, be given prior to any treatment," and set forth the applicable
eligibility criteria. 2 The individual notice also must state that the facility
will make a written determination, upon request, of whether the person
11 Id. at 49,955.
" Id. at 49,965-66 (to be codified in 42 C.F.R. § 124.505 (b), (c)).
Id. at 49,965 (to be codified in 42 C.F.R. § 124.505(b) (1) (iii)). The requirement that
the posted notice heading be legible at a distance of 15 feet was made necessary after site
investigations had discovered that 3 by 5 inch cards were utilized in some facilities with the
required notice printed in small type. Id. at 49,959.
11 Id. at 49,965 (to be codified in 42 C.F.R. § 124.505(b)(1)(ii)). HEW has defined a
community to be multilingual "if the 'usual language of households' of five percent or more
of its population, according to the most recent figures published by the Bureau of the Census,
is other than English." Id. The existing posted notice provision calls for multilingual notice
where the applicant serves such a community, but the regulation does not establish a mini-
mum percentage of non-English speaking residents which would deem the community '"mul-
tilingual." See 42 C.F.R. § 53.111(i) (1978).
1, 43 Fed. Reg. 49,954, 49,965-66 (1978) (to be codified in 42 C.F.R. § 124.505(b)(2)).
Section 124.505(b)(2) gives applicants the option of either posting notice that the facility has
met its obligation for the current period or adding language to the required posted notice to
the effect that if the facility satisfies its obligation for the period, anyone inquiring about free
service will be given a written statement to that effect. Id. In both instances, the notice will
state when uncompensated services will again be available. Id. The existing regulations give
Hill-Burton facilities the option of posting notice in the event the facility meets its free
services obligation before the termination of the period. See 42 C.F.R. § 53.111(i) (1978).
43 Fed. Reg. 49,954, 49,966 (1978) (to be codified as 42 C.F.R. § 124.505(c)).
" Id. at 49,959.
,0 See text accompanying note 61 supra.
" 43 Fed. Reg. 49,954, 49,966 (1978) (to be codified in 42 C.F.R. § 124.505(c)). Individual
written notice does not have to be given prior to the rendition of services if the emergency
nature of the services makes prior notice impractical. Id.; see text accompanying notes 89-93
infra.
22 43 Fed. Reg. 49,954, 49,966 (1978) (to be codified as 42 C.F.R. § 124.505(c)).
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will receive free services.7 3 The proposed regulation for individual notice is
designed to function in connection with the new provision for eligibility
determination.74 Hill-Burton facilities are required under the proposed eli-
gibility determination provision to make a prompt determination, upon
request, of a person's eligibility for free services.7 5 By requiring the facility
to provide individual notice before rendering services as well as requiring
a prompt eligibility determination, HEW reasons that anyone seeking an




The written notice requirement set forth in the proposed regulations of
October 1978 should be an improvement over mere posted notice. The issue
remains, however, whether the 1978 provision will provide the
"meaningful" notice that Newsom held necessary to satisfy due process.
Some of the criticisms directed towards the existing regulations78 are also
applicable to the proposed provision. The person who is seeking services
must still read the notice. He or she must also be able to understand the
notice and then inquire about free services at the appropriate location. The
only substantial difference in the proposed regulations is that the patient
or person seeking services should not have any difficulty seeing the notice
statement.79 Arguably, this difference may be great enough to make the
notice effective and meaningful. If all people seeking services are given
notice of the availability of free services, many might inquire about the
Hill-Burton program. Consequently, the individual written notice surely
would be deemed meaningful and thereby satisfy the due process stan-
dards of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. On the other hand, the
person to whom the notice is given may glance over the print and "see" it
73 Id. The notice shall state "that the applicant will make on request a written determi-
nation of whether the person will receive uncompensated services and will promptly inform
the person of the determination made." Id. (emphasis added).
7 Id. at 49,959.
7 Id. at 49,967 (to be codified in 42 C.F.R. § 124.508(a) (2)). The existing regulations
require eligibility determinations to be made prior to the rendition of services. 42 C.F.R. §
53.111(f)(1) (1978). The change was prompted by site investigations by HEW which found
that the existing provision is misunderstood by the facilities and difficult to monitor. Addi-
tionally, HEW discovered that documentation of the determination is often incomplete. 43
Fed. Reg. 49,954, 49,959 (1978). See also 42 C.F.R. 53.111(g) (1978). The proposed regulations
also call for federal criteria to replace the state guidelines, see note 24 supra, which vary
widely from state to state. 43 Fed. Reg. 49,954, 49,956 (1978).
11 43 Fed. Reg. 49,954, 49,959 (1978). Although the proposed regulations have eliminated
the requirement that the eligibility determination be made prior to treatment, HEW believes
that § 124.508, in conjunction with § 124.505(c) (prompt determination of eligibility), will
still be consistent with the Corum decision, since subsection (c) requires individual written
notice to be given before the rendition of services. Id. at 49,966 (to be codified in 42 C.F.R. §
124.505(c)).
7 See 453 F. Supp. at 424.
7' See note 59 supra.
7' Because written notice will be furnished to persons prior to the rendition of services,
they should have no difficulty in at least seeing the provision.
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only to the limited extent that persons now "see" the posted notices as
words printed on a sheet of paper. Of course, much of this problem depends
upon how the individual written notice is presented to the person seeking
services. If the notice is on a separate and distinct form with the heading
"ATTENTION-YOU MAY BE ABLE TO RECEIVE FREE MEDICAL
TREATMENT," the notice should be meaningful."0 Notice which is de-
signed to catch the reader's attention would undoubtedly be meaningful.8 '
However, notice in small print and hidden among numerous forms may be
only slightly better than the existing posted notice provision." Another
difficulty with individual written notice is that persons who read or glance
over the statements may be under great stress at the time. The anxiety of
the situation may prevent many persons from a thorough reading of the
notice of the availability of free services.8
Additional problems could arise if a patient arrives for admission with
another person who fills in the application for admission. Under the pro-
" The proposed regulations alter the heading for both the posted and the individual
written notice. The existing regulations for posted notice provide for the words "Notice of
Hill-Burton Obligation" at the top of the notice. 42 C.F.R. 53.111(i) (1978). The proposed
heading reads "Free or Below Charge Care Available." 43 Fed. Reg. 49,954, 49,965 (1978) (to
be codified in 42 C.F.R. § 124.505(b)(iv)).
1, Hospitals may not wish to broadcast the possibility of free services. According to the
Newsom court, Vanderbilt's policy was to say as little as possible about potential free treat-
ment. 453 F. Supp. at 416. The hospital was concerned that if all patients were aware of the
facility's free services obligation, many patients who could pay would try to defraud the
hospital to avoid paying for their hospital care. Id. at 417.
,1 Legislatures and governmental agencies other than HEW have recognized the import-
ance of the type size used in printed notices. The general disclosure regulation accompanying
the Truth in Lending Act, 12 C.F.R. § 226.6 (1978), provides that
[e]xcept with respect to the requirements of § 226.10, where the terms "finance
charge" and "annual percentage rate" are required to be used, they shall be printed
more conspicuously than other terminology required by this part and all numerical
amounts and percentages shall be stated in figures and shall be printed in not less
than the equivalent of 10 point type, .075 inch computer type, or elite size typewrit-
ten numerals, or shall be legibly handwritten.
Id.
The Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) issued regulations concerning the airlines' liability
limitation for lost, delayed, or damaged baggage. 14 C.F.R. § 221.176 (1979). Notice of an
airline's baggage liability limitations must appear on each ticket "in at least 10-point type
.... " Id. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has issued regulations governing the
size of print on food packaging. Section 102.41 of 21 C.F.R. requires that the words "made
from dried potatoes" appear on packaging of potato chips composed of dehydrated potatoes.
21 C.F.R. § 102.41 (1978). The words "made from dried potatoes" shall appear immediately
following or below the words "potato chips" in easily legible boldface type. Id. The words
must be printed either
[niot less than one-sixteenth inch in height on packages having a principal display
panel with an area of 5 square inches or less and not less than one-eighth inch in
height if the area of the principal display panel is greater than 5 square inches; or
(2) [n]ot less than one-half the height of the largest type used in the words 'potato
chips.'
'3 See 453 F. Supp. at 428.
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posed regulation, the individual written notice must be given to "each
person who seeks services in the facility on behalf of himself or another."'"
The ambiguity of this subsection may be better explained with an exam-
ple. If a worker were injured on the job and his foreman transported him
to the hospital and sought services for the worker, the foreman might
properly be the recipient of the notice of the availability of free services."
Unfamiliar with the patient's financial position, the foreman could easily
disregard such notice, effectively preventing the worker from applying for
free care unless the worker sees, reads, understands, and acts upon posted
notice. 6 Although the hospital complied with the individual notice require-
ment, it is doubtful whether such notice is meaningful to the patient under
these circumstances. 7 If, however, a relative is seeking services on behalf
of the person who can not pay, individual notice to the relative would
appear to be almost as meaningful as notice to the patient. The relative is
probably familiar with the patient's financial status and interested in help-
ing the patient find some means of paying for the hospital care should the
patient be unable to afford treatment. The above problem results from the
ambiguity in the phrase "seeks services on behalf of himself or another."
The issue is whether "seeking" is equivalent to "trying to pay for," or
means "trying to find," without incurring any liability. Perhaps the best
means of assuring that potential recipients of Hill-Burton services receive
meaningful notice and eliminating the ambiguity in the phrase "seeks
services" is to require that the notice be given either to the patient or to
the person who will be responsible for payment. Requiring that notice be
given to persons responsible for payment would alter the proposed regula-
tion which requires that individual notice be given to each person who
seeks services in the facility on behalf of himself or another.8
Section 124.505(c)(2) of the proposed regulations requires that individ-
ual notice be given before rendition of services except where such notice is
impracticable due to emergency services. 8 In an emergency situation, how-
ever, when the patient is unaccompanied, the patient or his next of kin
must be given notice as soon as practicable, "and in no event later than
the first rendition of a bill for the services.""0 Thus, there exists a slight
distinction in the proposed regulations regarding who must receive individ-
ual notice in an emergency situation when the patient has no one accompa-
43 Fed. Reg. 49,954, 49,966 (1978) (to be codified in 42 C.F.R. § 124.505(c)).
Because the foreman sought services on behalf of the injured worker, the foreman could
be the appropriate person to be notified of the availability of free services according to §
124.505(c). See 43 Fed. Reg. 49,954, 49,966 (to be codified in 42 C.F.R. § 124.505(c)).
81 See note 59 supra.
97 Assuming that the foreman does not act upon the individual written notice, the patient
will be left to rely solely on the posted notice provision which already had been held inade-
quate in Newsom. See text accompanying notes 54-61 supra.




nying him to the facility as opposed to the situation where another person
seeks services for the patient. When a patient is accompanied upon admit-
tance to the hospital, the hospital may meet its requirement by furnishing
notice to the patient, or the person seeking services for the patient.91 The
person seeking services need not be the patient's next of kin.2 This distinc-
tion may lead to less effective notice when notice is given to an unrelated
individual than when notice before care is impracticable and must be
made to either the patient or his next of kin as soon as possible. Such a
result follows from the assumption that the patient and his next of kin will
be more likely to know the patient's financial status and be more interested
in helping the patient procure free services than an unrelated individual. 3
Although individual written notice, if presented properly,94 could be an
effective means of notifying indigents of the availability of free services,
courts might find that only oral notice provides meaningful notice as re-
quired by due process standards. Hospitals might respond that oral notice
is logistically impossible and also would create a deluge of applicants for
free services. 5 Whether the proposed notice regulation will satisfy due
process standards cannot be answered until after the regulations are
adopted and their effect is measured. Individual written notice is an im-
provement over the existing posted notice provision. Patients will, accord-
ing to the proposed regulations, be exposed to notice of the availability of
free services in a way that is more likely to encourage indigents to apply
for free services than the posted notice provision. Furthermore, indigents
who apply for admission at a facility which has already met its free services
obligation for the current period will be notified of such fact before they
incur any liability.9" Thus, if the proposed notice regulation is adopted in
its current form, free services should be distributed to the poor more fairly.
MALcoLM S. DORRIS
91 Id.
92 Section 124.505(c)(1) states that "individual written notice of the availability of un-
compensated services to each person who seeks services in the facility on behalf of himself or
another." Id. (to be codified in 42 C.F.R. § 124.505(c)(1)) (emphasis added).
" See text accompanying notes 84-88 supra.
' Clear and conspicuous notice to each individual seeking services would be in accord-
ance with Newsom. See text accompanying notes 54-61 supra.
15 See 453 F. Supp. at 416-17.
" See text accompanying notes 80-82 supra.
' See 43 Fed. Reg. 49,954, 49,965-66 (to be codified in 42 C.F.R. § 124.505(b)(2)).
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